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“ D O N ’ T  P U T  A L L  Y O U R  E G G S  I N  O N E  B A S K E T . ” 
  
That timeless proverb not only carries an important message for many aspects  
of everyday life but is also the guiding principle behind a successful long-term  
investment program.  
Indeed, the most important determinant behind success or failure in 
investment management is not individual security selection or trading by  
investment managers. Research shows that about 90% of the  
variance in a portfolio’s investment returns over time is  Research 
explained by asset allocation, the process of determining the  shows that 
percentage of portfolio assets allocated to specific asset classes  about 90% of 
such as stocks, bonds, real estate, venture capital, et al. Asset  
the variance inallocation has its intellectual roots in the 1950s when econo­
mist Harry Markowitz, who was later awarded the Nobel Prize  a portfolio’s 
for his work, began developing what became known as mod- investment 
ern portfolio theory. returns over
The goal of asset allocation is to maximize returns at a  
prudent level of risk or to minimize the risk involved in  time is explained 
achieving a certain return. The process of determining the  by asset 
appropriate asset allocation involves an analysis not only of  allocation.  
available investment asset classes but also of the liabilities of  
an entity such as a retirement system. The needs and preferences of the  
investor are the basic building blocks of an asset allocation.  
In the case of a pension fund, board members have the exclusive purpose as  
fiduciaries to provide benefits for members and survivors through a program of  
prudent, expert investing. Their responsibility is to develop an investment pro­
gram where expected returns meet their system’s projected financial liabilities.  
Retirement board members must be sure their actuarial assumptions are sound,  
and they must assess the sensitivity of their portfolio to severe market declines  
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and whether the portfolio provides sufficient protection against inflation.  
The primary goal in constructing a portfolio is that the expected return be  
sufficient to satisfy an investor’s financial objectives and be commensurate with  
a level of risk that the investor is comfortable with. There are several asset class­
es, or groups of investment securities whose behavior is similar in response to  
changes in economic circumstances, and each class (i.e., stocks) has several 
subclasses (large capitalization, midcap, small cap; growth and value). The  
major inputs to an asset allocation process are the historical and expected  
returns for each distinct asset class or subclasses, the volatility of those returns  
over time, and the correlation of returns among the asset classes or subclasses.  
Risk means different things to different people. To a bungee jumper, it’s  
the possibility that the cord might break. For an investor, risk means the possi­
bility of losing money and not meeting one’s financial objectives. Similarly,  
asset allocation is like wearing protective gear in athletics. A competitor might 
perform better if not hampered by protective gear, but without it, a blow to an  
unprotected part of the body could prove disastrous. Someone investing over  
the past few years might conclude that large cap growth stocks are the only  
asset class needed for a successful portfolio. Although those stocks have indeed  
been by far the best performing asset class in recent years, a prudently con­
structed portfolio will also have assets in currently underperforming sectors like  
bonds, small stocks, and real estate. These sectors currently serve as hedges that  
may inhibit maximum performance today but should cushion the portfolio to  
some degree when the high-flying growth stocks cool off, as history and logic  
tells us they inevitably will. 
Thus, an asset allocation process today should properly include a number  
of different asset classes. It’s not unusual for one asset class or investment style  
to dominate returns for four consecutive years as U.S. large cap growth stocks  
recently did (1995-98), but other classes—including small caps, international  
stocks, and real estate—have enjoyed similar extended periods of superior per­
formance over the past quarter century. If we examine historical returns of  
large U.S. stocks, small U.S. stocks, international stocks, and high grade U.S.  
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bonds over the twenty years through 1998, there was only one year prior to 1995  
that large stocks provided the best performance among these four asset classes.  
An effective portfolio is not just the sum of its parts but should incorporate  
the expected interaction among those parts. Correlation measures the likelihood  
that two asset classes will move in the same direction, and selecting asset classes  
that have as little correlation with each other as possible should reduce risk and  
volatility in a portfolio while helping to achieve expected returns.  
A guiding principle of asset allocation is that a portfolio diversified among  
asset classes will never match the performance of the best asset class each year  
but it will also never equal the worst. The past few years, during which 
performance has been concentrated in a select group of U.S. stocks, have 
presented a serious challenge to proponents of asset allocation. Nevertheless,  
results from 1999 did show some distinct benefits from diversification among  
asset classes.  
H I S T O R I C  R E T U R N S  
Historical data from 1926-98 compiled by Ibbotson Associates (a firm well  
known for its collection and analysis of investment returns) gives the com­
pound annual returns of various classes of domestic stocks and bonds over this  
period, including large-cap stocks (11.2%), small cap stocks (11.8%), long-
term corporate bonds (5.8%), and long-term government bonds (5.3%). Data  
from shorter periods indicates the annual returns from additional classes, such  
as international stocks (12.7% since 1970) and real estate (9.0% since 1978).  
Stocks have indeed been the best performing asset historically. Over the  
ten years ending 1998, the outperformance of stocks over bonds was even  
greater than in the above-noted 1926-98 period as the S&P 500 gained 19.2%  
annually compared to 9.3% for investment grade bonds. Furthermore, since  
1926, the 1930s have been the only decade when bonds (long-term 
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governments) outperformed stocks (large or small caps). Returns on stocks are  
certainly volatile; more than one quarter of the time since 1926, annual returns  
have been negative. (Actually, the same observation holds for long government  
bonds although, as will be discussed, the magnitudes of gains and losses for  
bonds have been much smaller than those of stocks.) 
The advantages of stocks are seen over time; over the 64 overlapping 
10-year periods from 1926-98, large cap stock returns were positive 62 times,  
and they have been positive for every fifteen-year period over time. Stocks have  
outperformed bonds 61% of the time over one-year periods but 92% of the  
time over 20-year periods and 99% of the time over 30-year  
Stocks & periods. Thus, the longer an investor’s time horizon, the more  
bonds have both	 the portfolio should be biased toward equities. The advantages  
of equities are even more important after considering taxes  performed poorly  
and inflation. (Taxes, of course, are not a factor in pension  in periods of high  
fund investing.)
inflation & well  U.S. stocks clearly have a very favorable and impressive  
long-term return record, but one must be cautious when using  in periods of low  
either the widely-publicized Ibbotson numbers or any other  inflation.  
historic returns as projections for future returns. Of the 54  
overlapping 20-year calendar periods since 1926, stocks have returned less than  
10% nearly 40% of the time. More ominously, additional research shows that  
the best equity market returns were achieved from investments made during  
periods when the price-to-earnings ratios were generally within the long-term  
historic average range of 14 to g16. Investments made when P/E ratios were 20  
or higher (they are at all-time high of close to 30 today) resulted in typical  
annual returns of just 5% over the following 10 years. (As explained in the  
PERAC investment education presentation, Understanding Investments,  the P/E  
ratio—a company’s stock price divided by its earnings per share—is one of the  
most traditional measures of assessing the value of a stock.)  
Some other observations about historical returns include the fact that  
stocks and bonds have both performed poorly in periods of high inflation and  
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well in periods of low inflation. Indeed, inflation is one of the worst enemies  
of pension funds; during periods of high inflation, pension benefits tend to rise  
while investment returns are declining. The effect of business cycles is less  
clear; not every stock market downturn has corresponded with an economic  
recession and not every recession resulted in poor stock market performance. 
M A R K E T  T I M I N G  A S  A  S T R A T E G Y  
Before examining the basic principles of asset allocation, there is an offshoot of  
the traditional process called “tactical asset allocation” which involves aggressive  
movement in or out of asset classes depending on current perceptions of their  
attractiveness. Looking at historical returns, a strategy that favors “tactical”  
short-term swings into or out of markets, as opposed to a strategy of disci­
plined asset allocation, appears unlikely to succeed. In general, investment  
strategies that worked in the past often don’t carry into the future. It is difficult  
to predict short-term swings in the market and in attempting to do so, market  
timers expose the portfolio to additional risk. This is because returns have been  
often concentrated in short periods. 
Illustrating the concentration of returns, Ibbotson data show that if an  
investor had been out of the market during the S&P 500’s 40 best months from  
1926 through 1998, he would have a return less than that of Treasury bills. If  
one had invested in an instrument replicating the S&P 500 at year-end 1925  
and held it through the end of 1998, he would have amassed $2,351. If he had  
instead invested in Treasury bills continuously over this period, he would have  
had only $15. Pity the hapless market timer who was out of the market during  
the S&P’s 40 best months over that time; he would have had only $14!  
Adding to the futility—and the substantial risks involved—in trying to  
predict market swings is the burden of transaction costs.  
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I N V E S T M E N T  R I S K 
  
Consideration of investment risk is a vital component of the asset allocation  
process but it is not the only risk that fiduciaries must be aware of.  
Operational  risk refers to the possibility that an investment manager will fail  
to fulfill its mandate due to violation of guidelines, trading errors, inadequate  
risk controls, or outright fraud. Counterparty  risk refers to problems that may  
Just as 
arise from irregularities pertaining to a particular exchange,  
broker, or other financial intermediary.  
combinations of  The investment risk  of an asset consists of two parts: 1)  
Systematic risk,  also known as market risk or beta, which  risky stocks 
springs from general economic factors (such as a sharp interest  
exhibit less risk  rate rise) that affects all companies in a similar fashion,  
than individual  although with different magnitudes, and 2) Unsystematic  
risk,  which is unique to a particular asset (such as a potential-securities, 
ly adverse ruling from a product liability case) and unrelated  combinations of  
to the overall movement of the capital markets.
asset classes can  Another way of looking at the different types of risks is to  
consider systematic risk the market risk that investors are given  have less risk than 
and unsystematic risk the active risk that investors take.  individual 
asset classes.  
Diversification  eliminates unsystematic risk because the 
positive and negative results of specific companies within the  
portfolio tend to offset one another in a random fashion.  
Therefore, portfolios that are not well diversified are subject to increased volatil­
ity. Portfolio risk decreases as the number of stocks increases. Portfolios of 30  
stocks or more will have most of the unsystematic risk eliminated, particularly if  
they are priced in the same range and held in similar amounts. Similarly, just as 
combinations of risky stocks exhibit less risk than individual securities, 
combinations of asset classes can have less risk than individual asset classes.  
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A traditional way of looking at investment risk is to compare the ranges of  
annual asset class returns over time. Those with wider ranges of returns are  
considered to have greater volatility. Risk measures the possibility of losing  
money and, although both large-cap stocks and government bonds have lost  
money on an annual basis almost one quarter of the time since 1926, the mag­
nitude of swings has generally been much greater for stocks. The S&P 500  
returned 34.1% in 1995 while long-term bonds have never done better than  
the 18.2% registered by Treasuries in 1993. The S&P suffered a 26.5% loss in  
1974, while the worst year for bonds has been the 7.8% loss in 1994. In terms  
of quarterly performance, the differences are even more dramatic; since 1926,  
the worst quarterly return for bonds was –6.4% while that for large stocks was  
–37.7% and for small stocks -41.6%. Bonds often serve as a cushion against  
steep equity losses, as seen most recently in August 1998 when bonds had a  
positive return of 1.5% while stocks plummeted by 14.5%.  
There are a number of ways to communicate investment risk. Volatility,  
or the uncertainty of an asset’s return, is effective as a relative statistical meas­
ure. If an asset’s returns over time are plotted on a graph, the arithmetic mean  
is the center of the distribution and the standard deviation (a number derived  
from a mathematical formula) measures the spread. If returns have a normal  
(bell-shaped) distribution, 68% of all returns are expected to be within plus or  
minus one standard deviation of the mean and 95% of all returns are expected  
to be within plus or minus two standard deviations of the mean. For example,  
using statistics from 36 monthly returns, an investor considers two investments  
which both had average monthly returns of 5%. The first, with a standard  
deviation of 2%, would have had a typical range of returns (two standard 
deviations) over the 36 months of between 1% (5%-4%) and 9% (5%+4%).  
The second investment, with a standard deviation of 4% for the same period,  
would have experienced more volatile returns, with fluctuations between -3%  
(5%-8%) and 13% (5%+8%).  
As previously noted, annual returns on large cap stocks have been more  
than twice those of long-term government bonds since 1926, but the standard 
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deviation of those returns is also more than twice that of bonds. This 
significantly greater volatility explains the “risk premium” that investors have 
traditionally demanded of stocks relative to bonds.  
Data compiled by Ibbotson since 1926 show that both government and 
corporate bonds have had standard deviation of returns of about 9% while that  
of large cap stocks has been about 20% and that of small cap stocks (which had  
returns only slightly higher than those of large caps) was 30%. Looking at the  
figure for large caps, this means that with a compound annual return of slightly  
over 11% over this period, returns would have been within the range of –9%  
(11%-20%) and 31% (11% +20%) two thirds of the time. (Chart One shows  
the historical risk and return relationships between stocks and bonds.)  
Among other asset classes, intermediate bonds have shown about 60% of  
the risk of long-terms, and returns on real estate over the past 20 years indicate  
a relatively low standard deviation of about 7%. 
The value of stocks as long-term investments is seen in their declining risk  
measures over time. The standard deviation of stock returns over a one-year  
period is 18% but drops to a very low 2% over 30-year holding periods,  
demonstrating that investors who can live with high variability of annual  
returns can expect a healthy composite return over long periods with a great  
deal of certainty. 
After recovering from the Great Depression, annual volatility of large cap  
stock returns has changed very little from 1940 to the present. Indeed, the  
recent four-year period 1993-96 was the least volatile since 1963-66. On the  
other hand, volatility in bonds has increased substantially, first reflecting the  
higher inflation of the 1960s and 1970s and then reflecting the Federal  
Reserve’s new policy of targeting money supply growth that it adopted in 1979.  
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C O R R E L A T I O N 
  
The next step in asset allocation is to incorporate a measure of how various  
investments are expected to act relative to one another. The traditional input  
here is correlation,  a measure of the degree to which two series move together.  
Correlation ranges from –1, where if one rises in value, the other will fall  
(inverse correlation) to +1, where if one rises in value, the other will also (per­
fect correlation) with 0 representing a totally random relationship. Ideally,  
investment portfolios would consist of negatively correlated assets but most  
assets exhibit moderately positive correlation. For example, Ibbotson data indi­
cate that government bonds and corporate bonds have a positive correlation of  
0.94, German bonds and Japanese stocks have –0.06 (no correlation), and  
commodities and small stocks have a negative correlation of -0.40. 
Correlation can change over time in reaction to economic or political  
events. For example, largely reflecting the Federal Reserve’s changed monetary  
policy, the five-year rolling correlation between long-term bonds and large cap  
stocks—which was negative between 1956-66—has risen to the 0.30-0.60  
range in recent years. The correlations between Spain’s stock market and those  
of the European Economic Community have risen from 0.35-0.50 to in excess  
of 0.75 since Spain joined the EEC in 1986.  
By combining two assets into a portfolio, the expected return is an 
arithmetic average of the individual returns but the risk is dependent on the  
correlation between the two assets. If the assets are perfectly correlated (+1),  
there is no diversification gain and the portfolio risk is the average of those of  
the two assets. If the assets are negatively correlated, then all risk can be elimi­
nated. If the assets are not correlated (the most likely case), some risk can be  
eliminated by combining them. Thus, the standard deviation of a portfolio  
constructed by combining assets that are uncorrelated will typically be lower  
than that of either of the component assets. 
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History shows that small caps move together with large caps about three  
quarters of the time while the corresponding measures relative to large caps are  
about two-thirds for foreign equities, about 40% for real estate, and less than  
one third for bonds. Thus, bonds are seen as the best diversifying asset relative  
to large-cap equities and small caps the least effective in that regard.  
O P T I M I Z A T I O N  
Optimization in asset allocation is creating a portfolio that will achieve a 
particular return objective with the least amount of risk or a particular risk  
objective with as high a return as possible. An investor can theoretically choose  
from portfolios that consist not only of 100% allotments to specific classes  
(i.e., stocks) but also every possible combination of these asset classes to make  
up a total portfolio (e.g., 40% bonds, 60% stocks). Graphing expected returns  
versus standard deviation for each of these combinations, one derives an 
“efficient frontier”  of “optimal” portfolios that maximize expected return for  
each level of risk. Theoretically, adding more asset classes to the process will  
extend the frontier higher, producing higher returns for no additional risk. 
If one were to construct the above-noted graph with expected investment  
returns on the vertical axis and risk on the horizontal axis, this graph would  
have an entry for an all-stocks portfolio in the upper right sector (high return,  
high risk) of the chart and for all-bonds in the lower left (lower return, lower  
risk) of the chart. (The absolute lowest risk, lowest return entry would repre­
sent Treasury bills in the far bottom left of the chart.) The practice of asset  
allocation, in its most basic depiction, involves drawing a line between the two  
extreme points and determining what combination of stocks and bonds strikes  
the right balance between an investor’s required return and the level of risk  
he/she is comfortable with. In reality, the choice will involve more than just  
two broad asset classes because both the stock and bond markets consist of 
14  
several distinct styles and sectors and there also are the options of investing  
internationally as well as in additional asset classes such as real estate. Also, the 
“efficient frontier” of optimal asset combinations will typically be graphically 
represented by a curve whose points represent greater returns for a given level  
of risk than would be found on a straight line connecting the theoretical 
all-stocks, all-bonds, or similar points; this portrays the diversification gains  
that are achieved by combining asset classes that are not highly correlated.  
(Chart Two portrays the construction of a simplified efficient frontier using  
stocks and bonds.)  
Investment manager Roger Gibson, in a recent book on asset allocation, 
analyzed the returns of four major asset classes since 1972 on a year-by-year  
basis. Analyzing volatility levels and returns for all possible portfolio combina­
tions (including single asset investments and equally balanced combinations)  
using these asset categories, he concluded, “The pattern is clear. The more asset  
categories one includes in a portfolio, the higher the … investment’s 
risk-adjusted rate of return.”  
An important consideration in asset allocation is that, in order to produce  
portfolios that will be  optimal, not that were  optimal, the process of 
optimization requires forecasted  expected returns, forecasted  volatilities, and 
forecasted correlations. Historical data can, nevertheless, be very useful in the  
process of forecasting.  
Many investment consulting firms have optimization software that produce  
recommended asset allocations based on modeling of asset class characteristics  
and inputs based on client needs and preferences. Confirming that computers  
cannot substitute for human judgement, consultants acknowledge that these  
optimizers might produce a recommended asset allocation that may appear  
extreme in the context of conventional investing practice. Thus, the end result  
of an asset allocation process is usually not the output of a predominantly quan­
titative model but is the result of a process in which the consultant and the  
client determine a combination of assets that not only should help the client  
achieve his/her goals over time but also satisfies the comfort level of the client.  
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O N  T H E  O T H E R  H A N D … 
  
There are some vocal dissenting voices to the theoretical frameworks governing  
the search for today’s most efficient portfolios. First of all, some of the 
prominent research that inspired today’s basic principles of asset allocation is 
questioned. Critics claim that it is wrong to focus on portfolio volatility rather  
than portfolio returns and that investors should be more concerned about the  
range of likely outcomes over the investment planning hori-
They see zon than with the volatility of those returns. Also, the role of  
using largely historical returns to determine fixed allocations isthe large risk 
questioned because historical returns are not necessarilypremium 
reliable indicators of future returns. Indeed, historical returns  
traditionally  could actually be perverse indicators since they are the highest  
attached to stocks 	  after market tops. Another complaint is that attributing such a 
dominant role to asset allocation in determining portfolio out-relative to bonds  
comes serves to unfairly minimize the importance of costs.  diminishing.  
Particularly for individual investors but also for institutional  
ones, differences in costs—operating expenses, management  
fees, brokerage commissions, custodial fees, et. al.—can play an important role  
in portfolio performance over time. 
Also, some scholars question the emphasis on the historically far greater  
short-term volatility of stocks relative to bonds. They see the large risk 
premium traditionally attached to stocks relative to bonds diminishing as the 
differential in volatility between the two classes appears to be narrowing in  
recent years. For bonds, interest rates have become more volatile in recent years  
as the Fed fine tunes monetary policy in order to keep the economy growing at  
a sustainable pace. At the same time, stock investors may be perceiving less risk  
as a result of better investment education, new tax laws that have lowered 
capital gains taxation rates and have encouraged long-term holding in IRA  
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accounts, better governmental monetary and fiscal policy, less governmental 
  
economic regulation, and diminished foreign threats which give hope to an 
  
extended period of peace. As the historic bull market of the past decade has 
  
dramatically driven home the fact that stocks do outperform bonds over time, 
  
the “risk premium”, or extra return demanded by investors to compensate for 
  
the fact that stock returns are considerably more volatile than those of bonds, 
  
may be declining. 
  
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  I N V E S T I N G  The breakdown 
  
of trade barriers 
  
One of the most contentious areas of debate concerns the value  and advances in  
of international diversification. By placing a portion of assets in  communications  
markets thought to be not correlated with the U.S. market, can  technology have  
an investor really reduce the volatility of the portfolio while  
maintaining and sometimes increasing returns? The world’s  meant that 
markets, particularly those of the developed countries, seem to  previously 
be moving more in the same direction (if not in the same mag- independent  
nitude) in recent years. As investors in the fallen hedge fund  
Long-Term Capital Management painfully learned in August  economies are  
1998, diversification won’t dampen volatility when global  becoming more  
markets move together. Looking at one important recent  correlated to 
development, the monetary union in Europe that began in  
our own.  1999 will likely further the trend of making the characteristics 
  
of —and the returns from—markets on that continent 
  
increasingly similar. 
  
The debate over the benefits of international diversification won’t be  
resolved anytime soon, but it may indeed turn out that the benefits from that  
strategy may be overestimated because of the slow but steady trend towards an 
increasingly homogenized global economy. The breakdown of trade barriers  
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and advances in communications technology have meant that previously 
independent economies are becoming more correlated to our own.  
Certainly, there is no other major economy that has been firing on all 
cylinders like the U.S. over the past several years, a fact that has been reflected  
in our booming stock market. No other country is at the forefront of the 
technological revolution and also enjoys sound and stable economic and 
political leadership. The trouble with this argument against international 
diversification is that ten years ago investors were similarly drooling over Japan  
as the world’s invincible economy. Until a turnaround in 1999, after several  
years of stalled economic growth and failed political leadership, Japan’s 
economic and financial market performance turned out to be nothing short of  
disastrous during the 1990s.  
Furthermore, the U.S. recently entered the tenth year of an economic 
expansion, with joblessness at a 30-year low, and a stock market that has been  
rising steadily and is valued at historic highs according to most traditional 
measures. By contrast, Europe and Asia are several years behind in the growth  
boom and generally have much more capacity to expand, as seen in much high­
er unemployment rates and other measures. The U.S. has spent the past ten  
years merging, restructuring, and deregulating as well as transforming itself into  
an information economy, while Europe has made only about half the strides as  
the U.S. and Asia (particularly Japan) is just beginning. Investors in foreign  
equity markets were generally well rewarded relative to U.S. stocks in 1999.  
Aside from the economic arguments, analysis by Ibbotson Associates  
shows that the addition of international stocks  to a simple portfolio of U.S.  
stocks, bonds, and cash slightly improves the risk/return tradeoff; that is, it  
slightly raises the frontier of efficient portfolios offering modestly better returns  
for a given level of risk. Looking at dollar-denominated returns over 1970-98  
for the countries in the Morgan Stanley Europe Australasia Far East (EAFE)  
Index, the composite annual return was found to be 12.5% vs. 13.0% for the  
U.S. while the standard deviation was 19.2% compared to 17.3% for the U.S.  
A good number of the individual countries in EAFE had compound annual  
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returns higher than that of the U.S., including Ireland (19.5%), Hong Kong  
(18.8%), and the Netherlands (17.1%). Every country, however, exhibited  
greater volatility than the U.S., particularly Hong Kong (51.8%), South Africa  
(41.6%), and Norway (31.3%).  
The major reason justifying the use of international stocks is the fact that  
many non-U.S. stocks have relatively low correlation with U.S. stocks as well  
as with each other. Nearly every developed country has a historical correlation  
of less than 0.50 versus the U.S., with the exception of Canada, whose correla­
tion of 0.73 reflects its strong economic ties to the U.S. 
In response to those who say that increased economic globalization has 
lessened the value of international investing, Ibbotson research indicates that  
international equity correlations with the U.S. over the ten-year period 1989­
98 were only slightly higher than those for the period 1979-88, but the trend  
is surely upward.  
Historical data on emerging market  stocks has been compiled since 1985,  
and, through 1998, the record has not been very compelling. These markets do  
have low correlation with the U.S., but the compound annual returns of 19  
countries in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere were only half that of the U.S.  
while their composite standard deviation was 50% higher than that of the U.S.  
A number of countries, including The Phillippines, Chile, Columbia,  
Argentina, and Mexico did post superior dollar-denominated returns but 
several had volatilities that have been truly staggering, such as Argentina  
(175%), Brazil (105%), and Turkey (103%).  
As previously noted, however, asset allocation involves not just historical  
analyses but utilizes projections of future returns, volatilities, and correlations.  
If one adopts a more optimistic case for performance of emerging markets,  
then the addition of international and emerging markets stocks to a traditional  
U.S. portfolio could significantly improve the risk/return tradeoff.  
In a non-quantitative context, it is undeniable that the global economy is  
becoming more developed and that international investing is justified by the  
simple observation that the U.S. share of the world economic product has been  
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steadily declining and that an increasing number of the world’s most important  
corporations are based overseas. Similar to restricting one’s portfolio to a 
particular industry or style, limiting one’s investments to a particular region or  
country serves to severely constrict one’s opportunities in today’s world econo­
my. On the other hand, disadvantages of international investing include greater  
political and economic risk, currency risk, different accounting standards, and  
less efficient markets.  
O T H E R  C O N S I D E R A T I O N S  I N  A S S E T  A L L O C A T I O N  
Some of the most important decisions in the asset allocation process occur after  
the basic asset class decisions are made. Increasingly, the next step in the process  
is not to directly commence an investment manager search but to decide what  
portion of the assets should be earmarked for Active  vs. Passive management.  
Evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each style can involve many 
factors and competing arguments but the choice ultimately comes down to the  
chance for added value over a benchmark in an active approach versus a lower  
cost, more tax-effective (for non-pension investors) indexing approach (assum­
ing an appropriate index product is available for a particular asset class).  
Another frequent issue in asset allocation is rebalancing,  or what to do  
when the allocation to a particular asset class goes above or below pre-deter­
mined ranges as a result of changed market values or other reasons. Factors  
that enter into rebalancing decisions include transaction costs, liquidity, risk  
tolerance, and taxation (where applicable).  
Among the typical disciplines for rebalancing are 1) to do it on a set  
schedule but at least annually, or 2) when an allocation is more than 5% away  
from its target. An option for retirement systems that do periodic cash flow  
investing is to rebalance by investing in the assets with allocations that are cur­
rently too low. Another option is for retirement systems to work with their  
20  
consultants to consider a revision of their asset allocation.  
An effective rebalancing program is one that serves not only to reduce as  
asset class after an advance but also to buy one on weakness. Asymmetrical  
rebalancing is a variation where the allowable upside drift is greater than the  
allowable downside drift. For instance, an asymmetric range might let stocks  
drift up by 6% above the current range but down by only 3% before a 
rebalance is triggered. Using this scheme, holdings of domestic stocks in a  
portfolio with a targeted range of 35-45% for this asset class could go as high  
as 51% or as low as 32%. Since the average magnitude of equity bull markets  
is about twice that of bear markets, this type of strategy would  
An effectiveallow investors to capture more of a bull market before a  
rebalancing is triggered but also to take advantage of an asset  rebalancing 
class’s weakness.  program is one  
In addition to market-driven events that could lead to a that serves not  
rebalancing, asset allocation policies must be considered when  
an investor’s circumstances change. For individual investors,  only to reduce as  
revisiting asset allocation would follow changes in lifestyle  asset class after an  
(children, marriage status, death, etc.) or change in income  advance but also  
(promotion, career change, unemployment, or a major 
to buy one on  inheritance), or changes in investment objectives arising from 
  
time to retirement, real estate purchase, or education expense. weakness. 
  
For a pension fund, revised actuarial assumptions are one  
of the most likely triggers for asset allocation rebalancing. Also, it might be 
reasonable for the risk level assumed by a portfolio to be determined by the  
degree of funding; a retirement fund with a large unfunded liability and long  
funding period might be justified in an asset allocation dominated by equities  
while one that is fully funded or close to it might adopt a more conservative,  
income-oriented strategy.  
Whatever the methodology used, there are no regulatory obstacles to  
rebalancing for Massachusetts retirement systems since PERAC regulations no  
longer establish permitted percentage ranges for major investment asset classes.  
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S U M M A R Y 
  
Asset allocation is a practice whose benefits do not enjoy universal intellectual  
support among market professionals. Almost every week a new article is pub­
lished proclaiming the death of traditional asset allocation models. Most  
recently, an article in The Wall Street Journal  of February 7, 2000 bore the  
headline, “Fund Diversification Dies a Not Very Slow Death.” It noted the  
Asset allocation  
increasing difficulty of financial planners in defending asset  
allocation in light of the continuing dominant performance of  
can be seen as  large cap and technology stocks. While it has been a glorious  
market for investors with portfolios concentrated in these hot  representing an  
areas, it’s been “a bear market for asset allocators” in the words  
insurance policy  of one observer. Yet, this article also noted that asset allocation  
actually did fairly well in 1999. Although value stocks contin­
ued to badly lag growth stocks, international stocks outper­
against the day  
when today’s  
formed the S&P 500, emerging markets had a banner year,  hottest sector  
and small cap stocks also beat the large-cap S&P 500.
cools down.  A healthy debate will continue over the value of asset  
allocation and the best way to implement it. Nevertheless, in  
its most basic form, the objective of asset allocation remains one of prudence.  
It can be seen as representing an insurance policy against the day when today’s  
hottest sector cools down. Forseeing that day is difficult, and the opportunity  
costs in investment returns become real and sometimes painful when one 
sector such as U.S. large cap growth stocks has been dominant for so long. But  
history and logic both tell us that that day will inevitably come. 
At its best, asset allocation should not incorporate rigid, inflexible asset ranges  
nor should it encourage aggressive, frequent market-timing bets. The most effective  
use would emphasize the value of diversification among asset classes but also pro­
vide the flexibility to act when markets become clearly overvalued or undervalued.  
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In summary, the goal of asset allocation is to select a combination of assets  
that will generate a return sufficiently high but also sufficiently safe in order to  
meet a future financial liability. As noted at the beginning of this report, it is  
simply an expression of the centuries-old axiom of “don’t put all your eggs in  
one basket.” To use an even more comforting analogy, asset allocation is like a  
pillow: if one part of the pillow is punched in, another will puff out, and the  
benefits of portfolio diversification will provide the investor with steady  
enough returns so that he or she can sleep well at night.  
In reality, the world’s financial markets—and the relationships among  
them—are sufficiently dynamic and constantly changing so that asset 
allocation in practice does not conform to simple and cute analogies. Nor does  
it lend itself to simply choosing portfolio combinations from a neatly drawn  
graphical curve of “efficient portfolios”. Asset allocation remains more an art  
than a science since the models and assumptions used are approximations of  
the realities of an investment universe that is exceedingly complex and 
constantly changing.  
T H E  R E A L  W O R L D  
Despite the lingering controversies and the multitude of available optimization  
models, there seems to be a surprising degree of uniformity in the typical asset  
allocation of public pension funds across the country.  
A recent analysis of data submitted by nearly all of the public retirement 
systems overseen by PERAC afforded some reasonable estimates of the asset  
allocation of these systems at year-end 1998. The composite allocation to  
domestic equity  is estimated at 47% with a range of between 30% and 65%.  
Other estimated asset class holdings were  international equity  6%, domestic  
fixed income  31%, international fixed income  2%, domestic and interna­
tional balanced funds  5%, real estate  3%, alternative investments 1%, cash  
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and other 5%. Once again, while these figures are reasonable estimates, they  
should not be viewed as “official” because of incomplete data and the possibili­
ty that some accounts could be incorrectly categorized.  
Here are the reported asset allocations of two major public pension funds  
as well as an industry composite. Care should be taken in making direct 
comparisons among specific asset classes in these plans because of possible 
differences in classification methodology. 
Mass. Pension Reserves Investment Trust (PRIT) 6-30-99  
Domestic Equity 45% 
International Equity 16%  
Fixed Income 25%  
Emerging Markets 4%  
Real Estate 6%  
Alternative Investments 4%  
California Public Employee Retirement System (CALPERS) 10-31-99  
Domestic Equity 45% 
International Equity 20% 
Domestic Fixed Income 22%  
International Fixed Income 4% 
Real Estate 5%  
Alternative Investments 4% 
Cash 1% 
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“Pensions & Investments” The largest public defined benefit plans 12-31-99  
Domestic Equity 47%  
International Equity 14%  
Domestic Fixed Income 28%  
International Fixed Income 2%  
Real Estate 5%  
Alternative Investments 2%  
Other, cash 2%  
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